As I browse through my blog postings, reflecting on a quarter defined by philosophical arguments, scrutinizing speech and textual analysis (among many things) I am witness to an evolution of thinking. My ideas of the first amendment were sweeping and lofty—the first amendment being a coveted statement guaranteeing every individual the right to speak his/her mind no matter what. Little did I understand the nuances of the historical amendment. Having explored various aspects of the right to speech, I understand that judgment plays a large and important role in defining what is considered acceptable speech for the individual. Individual and personal responsibility plays an important role in deciding what is acceptable or not. This is to say that individuals have the choice to view or be exposed to material that they may or may not find offensive. The 'captive audience' argument falls flat for me every time as individuals can, in nearly every circumstance, select what they choose to view or be exposed to. We are consumers with choices. In many respects this absolves the speaker of a lot of his/her responsibility when it comes to burden of proof and instead insists that the consumer prove the speech had a negative effect or was erroneous.
While the supreme court rarely sides with advocates of individual self-fulfillment, it is the philosophical reasoning that I side with the most. Most specifically Haiman. He provides a clear analysis of personal responsibility Haiman examines four context-centered areas that are in direct opposition to philosopher's who propose and either/or system of communicative philosophy. The basis of his four theories is simple—the “social order exists to maximize individual liberty” (Tedford, 440). This is to say that individuals within a society are given the responsibility and obligation to practice free choice and are consequentially responsible for their own actions. Notice that there is far less emphasis placed on the system. The focus is the individual—absolving much of the government and political speakers from consequence. He states that the government has an obligation to promote communicational diversity. While certain aspects of communication/speech may not always be favorable, it does provide a healthy marketplace of ideas. While Chafee would argue that not all speech contributes to the social interest, the judgment of what is considered in the best interest of society is inherently individual. Based on community and individual standards, we should be able to judge what is in interest to us. The social interest is not at its foundation a group-identity. To coagulate the definition of social interest is to deny the fact that individuals are inherently different—their background experiences dictating their present day interactions.
Looking at my blog postings and reflecting on the class there are two instances where this does not work. When it comes to videos depicting animal cruelty and blatant child pornography, one must begin to scrutinize speech in terms of its social value. For me, this has absolutely no social value regardless of community standards and varying individual backgrounds. While a disturbed individual may be comfortable watching a crush video, community standards would dictate that a far larger majority of people would be completely disgusted by the material. Furthermore, life is involved. When certain speech has the threat of providing actual physical harm against another living being, then a high level of scrutiny needs to occur. This is not offensive but harmful. There is direct action taken to harm and damage the lives of certain creatures all of which adds nothing to the marketplace of ideas. Violence, especially physical violence, is not included as 'free speech' under the first amendment. While one may argue we do enact speech with our bodies, the action of killing something in the name of speech is deplorable.
Given that, I did defend Al-Timimi in my first blog posting. The main argument not protecting his speech was that there was an incitement of violence. However, this fails to take into account personal responsibility. Using the landmark case of Brandenburg as historical precedence, I argued that the immediate and imminent incitement standard did apply to Al-Timimi’s case. While many would argue that based on the information presented in the case Al-Timimi’s sentence was justified, I insisted that given the circumstances—both content, environment and time—his conversation was protected under the first amendment. Therefore the ruling was unconstitutional and in direct opposition to a landmark case which clearly established that the voice of dissent—perhaps not always favorable—is protected.
According to the Brandenburg case, “even threatening speech is protected, said the Court, unless the state can prove that the ‘advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action’” (Tedford, Herbeck 66). Granted, there is significant evidence which suggests that the individuals Al-Timimi talked to on September 16, 2001 did indeed travel to Afghanistan within the following days. However, and this is where one must recognize protection of Al-Timimi—the actions of the Muslim men after the conversation have little to no allegiance to Al-Timimi and his words. I quickly realized, and went back to Haiman for philosophical context, that individual responsibility plays an incredibly large role in the freedom of speech. The 'soldiers' who allegedly listed to his words were not a captive audience. Al-Timimi was not holding them hostage insisting that they listen to his words. They were their by choice and thus on their own free will. Again, the burden of proof falls on the audience and not the speaker. What those men decided to do after they left Al-Timimi has everything to do with their individual free will and very little to do with Al-Timimi's words.
For the most part I see myself supporting a strict scrutiny of punishment when it comes to punishing speech. The government must provide compelling reasons to regulate or punish speech. As stated direct incitement like death of a creature or exposure of a minor in a sexual manner is, to me, a compelling reason to restrict speech. Beyond that there is very little that deserves to be unprotected. The marketplace of ideas, while different for everyone, is a vital aspect of our society. Social standards are innately individualistic—it is unreasonable that there would be a universal definition and therefore a standard by which we judge all acceptable speech. The individual is at the foundation of my argument for it is the individual who ultimately dictates his/her consumption.
There is a shady gray area, however, when it comes to libelous statements and defamation. Though given my arguments I would insist that unless the speech incites harm against the individual of topic, then the speech must be protected under the first amendment. While most often speech is not in 'good taste' in terms of this presumed 'social standard,' it is a necessary model for the continuation of a free marketplace of ideas. Losing this would be detrimental to the foundational right of expression.
Issues of the first amendment are complex but intriguing for the mere fact that speech is so engrained in our culture as a means to get ahead. It becomes not only a tool of expression but action—hopefully within the boundaries of what is considered positive social action. In this sense we all have an obligation to perpetuate speech and promote a culture of communicational diversity.
Friday, December 4, 2009
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Animal Rights--not just for humans.
There is no denying the deplorable and patently offensive nature of videos depicting animal cruelty. Most specifically “crush” films—video depicting the act of stepping on small animals in order to satisfy sexual fetish is one of the more disgusting things and unnecessary things included in our society.
Framing these videos and other depictions of animal cruelty within the first amendment is an interesting concept. While I have generally been someone who has upheld first amendment rights fairly liberally (see Al Timimi), the 1999 law making it illegal to sell crush videos for profit seems on target. The argument of free-speech rights and expression falls flat in this case, citing the lack of important and meaningful content entered into society's intellectual conversation. These videos, aside from being a source of sexual pleasure for a small minority of people, have no place in society when it comes to the expression of ideas.
Philosophically speaking, videos of blatant animal cruelty hold little to no foundation. Many of the freedom of expression philosophers, evaluating the nature of “crush” videos, would more than likely question such first amendment rights. Both Milton and Mill may argue that animal cruelty videos add nothing to the marketplace of ideas and in no way intends to find and test truth. Furthermore, these videos hold no importance as it pertains to political speech. If anything, Chafee would argue that animal cruelty video holds no social interest and therefore garners little first amendment protection. Based on Chafee’s philosophical approach material is judged based on whether or not it is in the social interest or not. In terms of animal cruelty, this is a no-brainer. There is absolutely no social substance to these “crushing” videos.
The 1998 Sec. 48 public law clearly states that “Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.” The language is clear. It goes on to say in the subsection that this “does not apply to any depiction that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.” The language is clear with its target and intent. As far as I'm concerned, the law is not overly broad nor is it ambiguous in any way. It is clear that videos which are sold and document graphic behavior against animals is penalty under the law. Stevens’ video, while not sexual, does depict animal cruelty to a degree where animals are in inevitable danger of death. There is no political or historical value to the video and instead serves as a tool of entertainment.
As far as levels of scrutiny are concerned, with videos of animal cruelty it is reasonable to state that there needs to be a high level of scrutiny. This is to say that the government must demand of the speaker why they should be allowed to depict these acts of violence. This is a radical switch in opinion for me and indicates the case by case basis of determining the scrutiny level on a specific case. Rather than the defense having to prove the social worth of these animal cruelty films, I place the burden on the speaker who has deemed it socially acceptable. Their reasoning must be significant enough to warrant protection. It comes down to harm—would we accept a low level of scrutiny for a speaker who depicts the death of a human being? In many ways the government must be required to present little to no reasoning for blocking of such messages. Chafee would argue that because the speech serves no social interest and no search for truth, it deserves less protection. More than likely Chafee would agree that videos depicting animal cruelty are clearly indecent. The crush videos do nothing to promote truth or morality in society. Chaplinsky v New Hampshire cements Chafee’s views in terms of social interest and morality. The case states “that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” (Chaplinsky).In terms of doctrinal analysis, it may even be necessary to equate issues of animal cruelty to that of child pornography. To a large degree, just like child pornography, the subject of an animal-based video has little control over his/her intellectual and emotional agency. Harm is induced by the creator for a specific purpose without the consent of the subject.
In the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 it is made clear that material where “the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” is illegal. How does this differ at all from the depiction of brutal animal cruelty? While society values the lives of humans to a more severe degree, animals are living beings who need to be afforded similar rights.
One of the supreme court justices, sarcastically, brings up the question of having a television, pay-per-view program depicting the killing of humans. While a radical example, I think it does yield an interesting conversation concerning the rights of human’s vs. animals and what would be considered unprotected video. It would be safe to assume that such a program would not be protected and would immediately be forced off the air without any level of scrutiny. Some may argue that similarly, given my argument, images of war and car crashes would not be protected nor images of aborted babies. This is not true. All of these things, including war, are not necessarily by choice. There are other circumstances which have led up to these things happening and—while they may not be tasteful to some people—are protected speech in that they represent a reality. What is a choice is making the decision to either harm an animal or not. These crush videos are not by accident, they are meant to inflict harm on another living thing.
The harm principle does not apply to this topic. According to the harm theory, certain speech is protected if it does not cause harm to any specific person or object (bad tendency). We know this not to be the case when it comes to cases of dog fighting and this horrendous “crush” fetish. Lives are being destroyed and the speaker deserves to take full responsibility. The 1999 law by Congress is both strong and narrow enough to make it clear that any depiction of animal cruelty is strictly prohibited and is not protected under the first amendment because it holds no social value. Even if the material is used to inform of abuses there are ways around showing abusive and demeaning footage of animal cruelty. It is important to recognize that animal cruelty is illegal in all 50 states. It would make sense then that video footage of animal cruelty is equally illegal.
Framing these videos and other depictions of animal cruelty within the first amendment is an interesting concept. While I have generally been someone who has upheld first amendment rights fairly liberally (see Al Timimi), the 1999 law making it illegal to sell crush videos for profit seems on target. The argument of free-speech rights and expression falls flat in this case, citing the lack of important and meaningful content entered into society's intellectual conversation. These videos, aside from being a source of sexual pleasure for a small minority of people, have no place in society when it comes to the expression of ideas.
Philosophically speaking, videos of blatant animal cruelty hold little to no foundation. Many of the freedom of expression philosophers, evaluating the nature of “crush” videos, would more than likely question such first amendment rights. Both Milton and Mill may argue that animal cruelty videos add nothing to the marketplace of ideas and in no way intends to find and test truth. Furthermore, these videos hold no importance as it pertains to political speech. If anything, Chafee would argue that animal cruelty video holds no social interest and therefore garners little first amendment protection. Based on Chafee’s philosophical approach material is judged based on whether or not it is in the social interest or not. In terms of animal cruelty, this is a no-brainer. There is absolutely no social substance to these “crushing” videos.
The 1998 Sec. 48 public law clearly states that “Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.” The language is clear. It goes on to say in the subsection that this “does not apply to any depiction that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.” The language is clear with its target and intent. As far as I'm concerned, the law is not overly broad nor is it ambiguous in any way. It is clear that videos which are sold and document graphic behavior against animals is penalty under the law. Stevens’ video, while not sexual, does depict animal cruelty to a degree where animals are in inevitable danger of death. There is no political or historical value to the video and instead serves as a tool of entertainment.
As far as levels of scrutiny are concerned, with videos of animal cruelty it is reasonable to state that there needs to be a high level of scrutiny. This is to say that the government must demand of the speaker why they should be allowed to depict these acts of violence. This is a radical switch in opinion for me and indicates the case by case basis of determining the scrutiny level on a specific case. Rather than the defense having to prove the social worth of these animal cruelty films, I place the burden on the speaker who has deemed it socially acceptable. Their reasoning must be significant enough to warrant protection. It comes down to harm—would we accept a low level of scrutiny for a speaker who depicts the death of a human being? In many ways the government must be required to present little to no reasoning for blocking of such messages. Chafee would argue that because the speech serves no social interest and no search for truth, it deserves less protection. More than likely Chafee would agree that videos depicting animal cruelty are clearly indecent. The crush videos do nothing to promote truth or morality in society. Chaplinsky v New Hampshire cements Chafee’s views in terms of social interest and morality. The case states “that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” (Chaplinsky).In terms of doctrinal analysis, it may even be necessary to equate issues of animal cruelty to that of child pornography. To a large degree, just like child pornography, the subject of an animal-based video has little control over his/her intellectual and emotional agency. Harm is induced by the creator for a specific purpose without the consent of the subject.
In the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 it is made clear that material where “the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” is illegal. How does this differ at all from the depiction of brutal animal cruelty? While society values the lives of humans to a more severe degree, animals are living beings who need to be afforded similar rights.
One of the supreme court justices, sarcastically, brings up the question of having a television, pay-per-view program depicting the killing of humans. While a radical example, I think it does yield an interesting conversation concerning the rights of human’s vs. animals and what would be considered unprotected video. It would be safe to assume that such a program would not be protected and would immediately be forced off the air without any level of scrutiny. Some may argue that similarly, given my argument, images of war and car crashes would not be protected nor images of aborted babies. This is not true. All of these things, including war, are not necessarily by choice. There are other circumstances which have led up to these things happening and—while they may not be tasteful to some people—are protected speech in that they represent a reality. What is a choice is making the decision to either harm an animal or not. These crush videos are not by accident, they are meant to inflict harm on another living thing.
The harm principle does not apply to this topic. According to the harm theory, certain speech is protected if it does not cause harm to any specific person or object (bad tendency). We know this not to be the case when it comes to cases of dog fighting and this horrendous “crush” fetish. Lives are being destroyed and the speaker deserves to take full responsibility. The 1999 law by Congress is both strong and narrow enough to make it clear that any depiction of animal cruelty is strictly prohibited and is not protected under the first amendment because it holds no social value. Even if the material is used to inform of abuses there are ways around showing abusive and demeaning footage of animal cruelty. It is important to recognize that animal cruelty is illegal in all 50 states. It would make sense then that video footage of animal cruelty is equally illegal.
Harming a Reputation: Unprotected Speech?
Prompt: Consider the case of J.S. in Pennsylvania. The federal district court in that case applied the standards of Bethel v. Fraser to rule against protecting her lewd remarks off-campus. Do you think this case was correctly decided by the lower court, or, as a Supreme Court justice, would you instead insist that all cases involving postings on Facebook, My Space, etc., be judged under the standards of Tinker v. Des Moines? Be sure to draw upon both philosophical and doctrinal lines of reasoning.
The case of J.S. is complicated. While the creation of the myspace page occurred off campus and was initially distributed to a non-captive audience, it did eventually reach the academic atmosphere to a point where it interrupted the educational environment. The content of the myspace page, referring to the principal as both a sexual offender and pedophile, brings up severe issues of libel and defamation. That in and of itself is prosecutable. However, in terms of free speech I would argue that the federal district court in Pennsylvania was justified in using Bethel vs. Fraser as a clear precedent and consequently siding with the school district in its decision to suspend the student for 10 days.
While in most situations I would argue under the Tinker vs. Des Moines landmark decision, J.S. used lewd and vulgar speech which ultimately undermined the school's principal and put in danger his educational mission as well as that of the schools.
In the Bethel vs. Fraser ruling Justice Brennan concurred the judgment stating that “To my mind, the most that can be said about respondent's speech - and all that need be said - is that in light of the discretion school officials have to teach high school students how to conduct civil and effective public discourse, and to prevent disruption of school educational activities, it was [478 U.S. 675, 688] not unconstitutional for school officials to conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that respondent's remarks exceeded permissible limits.” In terms of the J.S. case, the respondent's remarks “exceeded permissible limits” due to the nature of the myspace page. It was clear there was an intent to defile the principal through the use of damaging information. Pedophilia is a damaging claim that would, if true, incite immediate reprimand. The fact that this was not true but rumored on a public social medium is a clear incitement to harm—perhaps not physically but in terms of social and academic agency.
Philosophically speaking, philosopher Zechariah Chafee would argue that J.S's speech was not in the social interest and therefore should have limited protection. There was no search for truth but rather a quest to destroy a reputation. In many ways, it could be classified as worthless speech as it does not serve to promote public interest or add to the public marketplace of ideas. Instead it serves to primarily damage. There is no attainment of truth in J.S.'s speech. In fact, if anything, the speech serves to promote the dissolution of truth.
If this incident were to have happened strictly off-campus—no viewing whatsoever by the educational community—it may be a different story. Because of its larger platform, the consequences are increased. For example, an interaction between two students in passing—mentioning the stuff J.S. included on the myspace page—while still defamatory does not have the same implications as a myspace page. Because of the nature of the incident and the distribution among the school it did create a negative environment for both students and staff. The fact that the information on the page centered around false facts (pedophilia, sexual abuse) indicates to a certain degree a level of hate speech. The intent was to harm this principal's career and defame his credibility with the confines of the school. The argument that this was produced off school grounds falls flat considering the audience was specifically targeted as students and faculty of the school. This is an issue of personal versus public expression. If J.S's intent was to garner revenge in a private manner this page would not have been made public. There was a clear intent to damage.
In terms of scrutinizing speech, Bethel vs. Fraser does not assume to enact any prior restraint. Rather, there is a doctrinal test of bad tendency. This is to say that once the words are spoken and they are words that offend others or might harm an individual then there is increased rationality to regulate or punish speech. In the case of J.S., there is clear bad tendency. It does not go as far as clear and present danger or incitement but does present offensive language with the intent to harm.
The previous case of Tinker vs. Des Moines grants greater free speech to students and rightfully so. In terms of free speech and education the supreme courts famous statement, the first amendment should “not be left at the school house door” speaks volumes. However, the opinion of the court in the case makes it clear that public schools must have a substantial reason for limiting or punishing student expression. In terms of J.S.'s case, one can easily argue that the reason is substantial. With the freedom of speech arrives a responsibility. While I agree with the Tinker vs. Des Moines case in that it grants greater free speech rights to students, the nature of the speech needs to be examined just as it would outside of an educational atmosphere. J.S. clearly did not understand the weight that comes with free speech. Instead of using it as a platform to enter into conversation and contribute to the marketplace of ideas she ultimately used her voice for severe defamation.
The case of J.S. is complicated. While the creation of the myspace page occurred off campus and was initially distributed to a non-captive audience, it did eventually reach the academic atmosphere to a point where it interrupted the educational environment. The content of the myspace page, referring to the principal as both a sexual offender and pedophile, brings up severe issues of libel and defamation. That in and of itself is prosecutable. However, in terms of free speech I would argue that the federal district court in Pennsylvania was justified in using Bethel vs. Fraser as a clear precedent and consequently siding with the school district in its decision to suspend the student for 10 days.
While in most situations I would argue under the Tinker vs. Des Moines landmark decision, J.S. used lewd and vulgar speech which ultimately undermined the school's principal and put in danger his educational mission as well as that of the schools.
In the Bethel vs. Fraser ruling Justice Brennan concurred the judgment stating that “To my mind, the most that can be said about respondent's speech - and all that need be said - is that in light of the discretion school officials have to teach high school students how to conduct civil and effective public discourse, and to prevent disruption of school educational activities, it was [478 U.S. 675, 688] not unconstitutional for school officials to conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that respondent's remarks exceeded permissible limits.” In terms of the J.S. case, the respondent's remarks “exceeded permissible limits” due to the nature of the myspace page. It was clear there was an intent to defile the principal through the use of damaging information. Pedophilia is a damaging claim that would, if true, incite immediate reprimand. The fact that this was not true but rumored on a public social medium is a clear incitement to harm—perhaps not physically but in terms of social and academic agency.
Philosophically speaking, philosopher Zechariah Chafee would argue that J.S's speech was not in the social interest and therefore should have limited protection. There was no search for truth but rather a quest to destroy a reputation. In many ways, it could be classified as worthless speech as it does not serve to promote public interest or add to the public marketplace of ideas. Instead it serves to primarily damage. There is no attainment of truth in J.S.'s speech. In fact, if anything, the speech serves to promote the dissolution of truth.
If this incident were to have happened strictly off-campus—no viewing whatsoever by the educational community—it may be a different story. Because of its larger platform, the consequences are increased. For example, an interaction between two students in passing—mentioning the stuff J.S. included on the myspace page—while still defamatory does not have the same implications as a myspace page. Because of the nature of the incident and the distribution among the school it did create a negative environment for both students and staff. The fact that the information on the page centered around false facts (pedophilia, sexual abuse) indicates to a certain degree a level of hate speech. The intent was to harm this principal's career and defame his credibility with the confines of the school. The argument that this was produced off school grounds falls flat considering the audience was specifically targeted as students and faculty of the school. This is an issue of personal versus public expression. If J.S's intent was to garner revenge in a private manner this page would not have been made public. There was a clear intent to damage.
In terms of scrutinizing speech, Bethel vs. Fraser does not assume to enact any prior restraint. Rather, there is a doctrinal test of bad tendency. This is to say that once the words are spoken and they are words that offend others or might harm an individual then there is increased rationality to regulate or punish speech. In the case of J.S., there is clear bad tendency. It does not go as far as clear and present danger or incitement but does present offensive language with the intent to harm.
The previous case of Tinker vs. Des Moines grants greater free speech to students and rightfully so. In terms of free speech and education the supreme courts famous statement, the first amendment should “not be left at the school house door” speaks volumes. However, the opinion of the court in the case makes it clear that public schools must have a substantial reason for limiting or punishing student expression. In terms of J.S.'s case, one can easily argue that the reason is substantial. With the freedom of speech arrives a responsibility. While I agree with the Tinker vs. Des Moines case in that it grants greater free speech rights to students, the nature of the speech needs to be examined just as it would outside of an educational atmosphere. J.S. clearly did not understand the weight that comes with free speech. Instead of using it as a platform to enter into conversation and contribute to the marketplace of ideas she ultimately used her voice for severe defamation.
Friday, October 23, 2009
Sexting, a protected medium of speech
Sexuality is innately human—an inherent a carnal desire played out by even the most conservative. The way in which we express our innermost sexual desires varies from person to person. With the advent of new technology it has become increasingly easier to transmit sexual messages with the intent to arouse. At its foundation sexual interaction is something very personal. The way in which human beings interact with each other depends largely on cultural and familial upbringing. Alternatively, the way in which society handles sexual interaction has become less personal and more controlled. Controlling of sexuality is not something new. For centuries women have been controlled in order to suppress sexual desire, arousal and pleasure. The culture in which we live is so negatively driven when it comes to sex. It has been engrained as something shameful, hurtful and embarrassing. The only reaction to this public shame is to move to a medium with a veil of secrecy.
Because of so many new outlets in which we can express ourselves, the negative sexual atmosphere has been alleviated. People are now able to interact behind a veil of secrecy while still expressing their sexual desires. Whether this comes in the form of a webcam, texting or online photos there is an outlet not once offered to millions of people. It is with this understanding that I argue these sexual mediums are at its foundation personal. There is no room for the suppression of freedom of expression within the home. What is deeply personal should be protected. Sexuality is not dictated by the state. Stanley v Georgia states that in the privacy of ones own home, the government has no right to infringe on what he/she decides to do when it comes to sexual material. Privacy plays an important factor in the freedom of speech in this case. For erotica material, privacy translates to freedom. In the opinion of the Supreme Court Justice Marshall states that “If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitution heritable rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds” (Stanley v. Georgia). This is to say that the government should operate under the notion that individual choice of consumption is inherently tied to the first amendment. Just as church and state have traditionally been separated, the government implies that the state should have little involvement with ones personal life inside the home—a place with no captive audience or direct harm to others.
Material is not indecent or obscene if it is communicated between two consenting individuals. Self-gratification theorists like Haiman would suggest that individuals will be in the best judgment of their interests. This is to say people will seek out that in which they wish to entertain themselves. The internet is a location in which people have ample opportunity to steer away from content. Same with cell phones and other technological devices. It takes a user to search and interact with content.
According to the FCC v. Pacifica Foundation in 1978, indecent speech was defined as “language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by community standards for the broadcast medium.” There are a couple key things to point out from this landmark decision. First and foremost, when it comes to personal sexual arousal with the use of technology—pornographic material, “sexting,” webcamming, etc—there is little to no community standard which can be applied. A community standard implies that this is a communal decision or something, rather, that affects the community at large. When we discuss personal technological sexual arousal, we refer primarily to interactions between two consenting individuals. It is an action they have taken, thus exposing only themselves to any and all sexual material.
Again, Stanley v. Georgia states that “A state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or films he may watch.” The same applies to all technological sources. Like the book, the internet, webcam and cellphone all have a personal responsibility attached with them. This is to say that unlike the television there is the immense opportunity for consumers to decide the information in which they want to consume. We do not have to be forced to view pornographic material on the internet nor do we not have a choice in webcamming in a sexual manner.
It is important to cite the landmark case of Reno v. ACLU in 1997—the first case concerning cyberspace and free speech. In the decision the court clearly ruled that the internet deserved the utmost amount of protection. The court stated that “governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.” Like Milton, the theory of the marketplace of ideas –even though sexually based—is encouraged and deserves to be honored precisely because it is individualistic in nature. Sexual imagery is an important addition to the marketplace of ideas as it is a topic that relates directly to the most human aspect of who we are—our sexuality. As stated, we live in a sex-negative culture. We all need a greater understanding that technology allows us to create an atmosphere of decreased stigmatization. With this said, I would propose increasing Stanley v Georgia to include the protection of sending and receiving obscene live webcams. The fact of the matter is, these videos being sent are often between two consenting individuals. They are rarely ever forced and even if they were, individuals have the option of blocking such material. We have choices as to what we consume. Furthermore, the definition of what is considered obscene is completely subjective. Community standards don’t even apply, as sexuality is inherently something very personal and individualistic.
There is no incitement of danger in sexting or webcamming nor does it prove any indecency or obscenity if it is between two consenting parties who are of-age. It may in the sense that ethically people may not agree with it, but what it comes down to is an individual right—expressed in both Stanley v. Georgia and Reno v. ACLU. I would advocating expanding the former in hopes that the government take even less of a position in regulating what individuals do inside their homes. The promotion of sexual identity and freedom will only serve to strengthen the first amendment and the freedoms it guarantees people. The first amendment does not stop at safe, consensual and important sexual expression.
Because of so many new outlets in which we can express ourselves, the negative sexual atmosphere has been alleviated. People are now able to interact behind a veil of secrecy while still expressing their sexual desires. Whether this comes in the form of a webcam, texting or online photos there is an outlet not once offered to millions of people. It is with this understanding that I argue these sexual mediums are at its foundation personal. There is no room for the suppression of freedom of expression within the home. What is deeply personal should be protected. Sexuality is not dictated by the state. Stanley v Georgia states that in the privacy of ones own home, the government has no right to infringe on what he/she decides to do when it comes to sexual material. Privacy plays an important factor in the freedom of speech in this case. For erotica material, privacy translates to freedom. In the opinion of the Supreme Court Justice Marshall states that “If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitution heritable rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds” (Stanley v. Georgia). This is to say that the government should operate under the notion that individual choice of consumption is inherently tied to the first amendment. Just as church and state have traditionally been separated, the government implies that the state should have little involvement with ones personal life inside the home—a place with no captive audience or direct harm to others.
Material is not indecent or obscene if it is communicated between two consenting individuals. Self-gratification theorists like Haiman would suggest that individuals will be in the best judgment of their interests. This is to say people will seek out that in which they wish to entertain themselves. The internet is a location in which people have ample opportunity to steer away from content. Same with cell phones and other technological devices. It takes a user to search and interact with content.
According to the FCC v. Pacifica Foundation in 1978, indecent speech was defined as “language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by community standards for the broadcast medium.” There are a couple key things to point out from this landmark decision. First and foremost, when it comes to personal sexual arousal with the use of technology—pornographic material, “sexting,” webcamming, etc—there is little to no community standard which can be applied. A community standard implies that this is a communal decision or something, rather, that affects the community at large. When we discuss personal technological sexual arousal, we refer primarily to interactions between two consenting individuals. It is an action they have taken, thus exposing only themselves to any and all sexual material.
Again, Stanley v. Georgia states that “A state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or films he may watch.” The same applies to all technological sources. Like the book, the internet, webcam and cellphone all have a personal responsibility attached with them. This is to say that unlike the television there is the immense opportunity for consumers to decide the information in which they want to consume. We do not have to be forced to view pornographic material on the internet nor do we not have a choice in webcamming in a sexual manner.
It is important to cite the landmark case of Reno v. ACLU in 1997—the first case concerning cyberspace and free speech. In the decision the court clearly ruled that the internet deserved the utmost amount of protection. The court stated that “governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.” Like Milton, the theory of the marketplace of ideas –even though sexually based—is encouraged and deserves to be honored precisely because it is individualistic in nature. Sexual imagery is an important addition to the marketplace of ideas as it is a topic that relates directly to the most human aspect of who we are—our sexuality. As stated, we live in a sex-negative culture. We all need a greater understanding that technology allows us to create an atmosphere of decreased stigmatization. With this said, I would propose increasing Stanley v Georgia to include the protection of sending and receiving obscene live webcams. The fact of the matter is, these videos being sent are often between two consenting individuals. They are rarely ever forced and even if they were, individuals have the option of blocking such material. We have choices as to what we consume. Furthermore, the definition of what is considered obscene is completely subjective. Community standards don’t even apply, as sexuality is inherently something very personal and individualistic.
There is no incitement of danger in sexting or webcamming nor does it prove any indecency or obscenity if it is between two consenting parties who are of-age. It may in the sense that ethically people may not agree with it, but what it comes down to is an individual right—expressed in both Stanley v. Georgia and Reno v. ACLU. I would advocating expanding the former in hopes that the government take even less of a position in regulating what individuals do inside their homes. The promotion of sexual identity and freedom will only serve to strengthen the first amendment and the freedoms it guarantees people. The first amendment does not stop at safe, consensual and important sexual expression.
Friday, October 9, 2009
Protect His Speech: The Case for Al-Timimi
The United States v. Ali Al-Timimi is a complicated case in the protection of free speech. To a certain extent the argument is representative of a larger societal problem—the appropriateness and protection of voicing dissent against one’s government. Does this case exemplify unjust reaction to vocal dissent? Or, rather, based on the decision does vocal action often lead towards intent to harm? It is highly debatable as to whether or not Al-Timimi’s vocal dissent was intended to cause direct and unlawful harm to the United States.
Using the landmark case of Brandenburg as historical precedent, I will argue that the immediate and imminent incitement standard applies to Al-Timimi’s case. While many would argue that based on the information presented in the case Al-Timimi’s sentence was justified, I will argue that given the circumstances—both content, environment and time—his conversation was protected under the first amendment. Therefore the conviction is unconstitutional and in direct opposition to a landmark case which clearly established that the voice of dissent—perhaps not always favorable—is protected. This is a tough position to argue given the evidence, but one that deserves special attention if we are truly scrutinizing the first amendment.
According to the Brandenburg case, “even threatening speech is protected, said the Court, unless the state can prove that the ‘advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action’” (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969). Granted, there is significant evidence which suggests that the individuals Al-Timimi talked to on September 16, 2001 did indeed travel to Afghanistan within the following days. However, and this is where one must recognize protection of Al-Timimi—the actions of the Muslim men after the conversation have little to no allegiance to Al-Timimi and his words.
One must put into perspective the timing of this incident. The atmosphere of the country post-9/11 was less than supportive for the Muslim and Middle Eastern populations. President George W. Bush himself made it clear through his rhetoric that “these people” would face severe consequences for their actions. What was meant to be an indictment against the 9/11 hijackers specifically became a way in which Americans began to criminalize the Middle Eastern population as a whole.
For Muslim populations both emotions and fear were high following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It would seem completely plausible that Al Timimi’s speech was a reaction to the reaction. When one is placed in a position of the “Other,” often times the most immediate response (and this was immediate—a total of 5 days after the attacks) is to respond with anger. Language is powerful, but action is even more powerful. As far as the records indicate, Al-Timimi himself did not partake in any direction action pertaining to treason. It was the Muslim men he had a conversation with who ultimately took the action in which Al-Timimi did not. Where is their responsibility in this incident?
The Brandenburg precedence clearly states that “to be punishable, the speech in question must be more than ‘talking big’ or ‘blowing off steam’” (Tedford, Herbeck 67). Given that the timing of this conversation can very well be interpreted as a period of “blowing off steam,” it would seem that the circumstances and content in which Al-Timimi spoke was protected under the first amendment.
Let us visit an example that can be applied to the Al-Timimi case when it comes to speech that is either protected or intends to incite lawless action. There is no denying that hate speech is a very realistic aspect of our country’s rhetoric. Take for example the usage of the word “fag” in an utterly derogatory way. There is no denying that the language itself is despicable—it really has no place in our national dialogue. However, it is a form of speech that is and should be protected under the first amendment. I will take it a step further and more controversially state that phrases (which have been used—witnessed myself by children) such as “That fag should die” is speech that again, while horrendous, is protected under the first amendment. Now. If someone said this phrase to a group of individuals and consequentially one of them enacted out this action we cannot blame the speaker. Yes, the language was destructive.
For those who argue that Al-Timimi incited these people to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan, I would direct them to the ruling by the U.S. District Court in Maryland who defended a publishing company’s right to publish Hit Man—an instructional guide on how to commit murder for hire. The lawsuit arrived after James Perry killed three people and it was discovered that he had a copy of Hit Man. Once again, the material itself is not beneficial to society as a whole but to judge an individual’s action based on the words of another is to be ignorant to the fact that human beings are inherently personally responsible. We may blame the people who speak but ultimately it is up to the listener to take action. The Maryland district court stated that “First Amendment protection is not eliminated simply because a publication of an idea creates a potential hazard” (Paladin, 73). Potential is a key word here. There is an assumption that something harmful is going to happen with hateful and language of dissent. This is not always true nor does it provide justifiable cause to inhibit someone from speaking freely to a group of people. While the U.S. District Court’s decision was eventually reversed by the Appeals Court insisting that the informational guide was “aiding and abetting” a crime, I would argue that theoretically the Paladin precedent still remains correct. We can not control individuals consumption of a product and consequentially how they will interact with that product.
As far as philosophical perspective is concerned, I believe that Edwin Baker’s Liberty Theory most directly applies to this case. The liberty theory, at its foundation, advocates for the protection of individuals to determine and make their own choices regarding certain controversial subjects. Baker insists that freedom of speech is inherently individual-based in that it is not only something that contributes to the collective good but to the value of the individual. When placed in context of the Al-Timimi case, while the content of the conversation may not have been beneficial for the collective good, it was Al-Timimi’s speech. Even if it was construed as inciting imminent danger, the language represented value to Al-Timimi who was upset at the time.
Emerson’s “Expression-Action:” theory also is applicable to this argument in that there is a distinct different between the expression of words and taking those words into action. Again—I go back to the argument that we cannot blame the speaker for others’ actions. Personal responsibility has such a high stake in this argument. Knowledge and speech does not always translate into action nor did Al-Timimi’s verbal actions result in him partaking in any physical action.
With all of this said I would advocate Al-Timimi receive no sentencing. There is strong evidence to suggest that he was very direct in his statements to these Muslim men. However, his individual participation does not justify sentencing. Religiously based or not, freedom of speech plays an important part in the consciousness of our country. While not always agreeable nor with positive results, it is a fundamental right in which we must preserve.
Using the landmark case of Brandenburg as historical precedent, I will argue that the immediate and imminent incitement standard applies to Al-Timimi’s case. While many would argue that based on the information presented in the case Al-Timimi’s sentence was justified, I will argue that given the circumstances—both content, environment and time—his conversation was protected under the first amendment. Therefore the conviction is unconstitutional and in direct opposition to a landmark case which clearly established that the voice of dissent—perhaps not always favorable—is protected. This is a tough position to argue given the evidence, but one that deserves special attention if we are truly scrutinizing the first amendment.
According to the Brandenburg case, “even threatening speech is protected, said the Court, unless the state can prove that the ‘advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action’” (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969). Granted, there is significant evidence which suggests that the individuals Al-Timimi talked to on September 16, 2001 did indeed travel to Afghanistan within the following days. However, and this is where one must recognize protection of Al-Timimi—the actions of the Muslim men after the conversation have little to no allegiance to Al-Timimi and his words.
One must put into perspective the timing of this incident. The atmosphere of the country post-9/11 was less than supportive for the Muslim and Middle Eastern populations. President George W. Bush himself made it clear through his rhetoric that “these people” would face severe consequences for their actions. What was meant to be an indictment against the 9/11 hijackers specifically became a way in which Americans began to criminalize the Middle Eastern population as a whole.
For Muslim populations both emotions and fear were high following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It would seem completely plausible that Al Timimi’s speech was a reaction to the reaction. When one is placed in a position of the “Other,” often times the most immediate response (and this was immediate—a total of 5 days after the attacks) is to respond with anger. Language is powerful, but action is even more powerful. As far as the records indicate, Al-Timimi himself did not partake in any direction action pertaining to treason. It was the Muslim men he had a conversation with who ultimately took the action in which Al-Timimi did not. Where is their responsibility in this incident?
The Brandenburg precedence clearly states that “to be punishable, the speech in question must be more than ‘talking big’ or ‘blowing off steam’” (Tedford, Herbeck 67). Given that the timing of this conversation can very well be interpreted as a period of “blowing off steam,” it would seem that the circumstances and content in which Al-Timimi spoke was protected under the first amendment.
Let us visit an example that can be applied to the Al-Timimi case when it comes to speech that is either protected or intends to incite lawless action. There is no denying that hate speech is a very realistic aspect of our country’s rhetoric. Take for example the usage of the word “fag” in an utterly derogatory way. There is no denying that the language itself is despicable—it really has no place in our national dialogue. However, it is a form of speech that is and should be protected under the first amendment. I will take it a step further and more controversially state that phrases (which have been used—witnessed myself by children) such as “That fag should die” is speech that again, while horrendous, is protected under the first amendment. Now. If someone said this phrase to a group of individuals and consequentially one of them enacted out this action we cannot blame the speaker. Yes, the language was destructive.
For those who argue that Al-Timimi incited these people to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan, I would direct them to the ruling by the U.S. District Court in Maryland who defended a publishing company’s right to publish Hit Man—an instructional guide on how to commit murder for hire. The lawsuit arrived after James Perry killed three people and it was discovered that he had a copy of Hit Man. Once again, the material itself is not beneficial to society as a whole but to judge an individual’s action based on the words of another is to be ignorant to the fact that human beings are inherently personally responsible. We may blame the people who speak but ultimately it is up to the listener to take action. The Maryland district court stated that “First Amendment protection is not eliminated simply because a publication of an idea creates a potential hazard” (Paladin, 73). Potential is a key word here. There is an assumption that something harmful is going to happen with hateful and language of dissent. This is not always true nor does it provide justifiable cause to inhibit someone from speaking freely to a group of people. While the U.S. District Court’s decision was eventually reversed by the Appeals Court insisting that the informational guide was “aiding and abetting” a crime, I would argue that theoretically the Paladin precedent still remains correct. We can not control individuals consumption of a product and consequentially how they will interact with that product.
As far as philosophical perspective is concerned, I believe that Edwin Baker’s Liberty Theory most directly applies to this case. The liberty theory, at its foundation, advocates for the protection of individuals to determine and make their own choices regarding certain controversial subjects. Baker insists that freedom of speech is inherently individual-based in that it is not only something that contributes to the collective good but to the value of the individual. When placed in context of the Al-Timimi case, while the content of the conversation may not have been beneficial for the collective good, it was Al-Timimi’s speech. Even if it was construed as inciting imminent danger, the language represented value to Al-Timimi who was upset at the time.
Emerson’s “Expression-Action:” theory also is applicable to this argument in that there is a distinct different between the expression of words and taking those words into action. Again—I go back to the argument that we cannot blame the speaker for others’ actions. Personal responsibility has such a high stake in this argument. Knowledge and speech does not always translate into action nor did Al-Timimi’s verbal actions result in him partaking in any physical action.
With all of this said I would advocate Al-Timimi receive no sentencing. There is strong evidence to suggest that he was very direct in his statements to these Muslim men. However, his individual participation does not justify sentencing. Religiously based or not, freedom of speech plays an important part in the consciousness of our country. While not always agreeable nor with positive results, it is a fundamental right in which we must preserve.
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
Your God, My Speech: Blog Post 1.
Communication laws often become a shady grey area. What is deemed acceptable and appropriate to one individual may be wholly different to another. Consequentially, the process of reconciling these two differences becomes an area of concern. How do we create an appropriate atmosphere for both schools of thought?
When it comes to religious expression, or denouncement of it for that matter, people are often up in arms following an act of free speech that is in contradiction to their beliefs. Ultimately, we all seek that in which solidifies our previously held beliefs. Look no further than the viewing demographic for both Fox News and MSNBC—two incredibly polarized news organizations.
It is with this ignorance and stubborn attitude that I argue towards the protection of individual civil liberty regardless of the fact if it is used against the group.
The group model does not work. It is failing. While individuals naturally flock to group settings, a collective community in this day and age (religious, political) is primarily established out of hate. An “us vs. them” mentality has been created in the United States wherein for interest groups those which do not within the boundaries of their viewpoints are automatically dismissed.
We all need to be watchdogs of these groups that spew language of hate, messages of intolerance and overall demeanor's of ignorance. By allowing a more individually based law governing communication, higher responsibility is placed on the individual to continually question and ask more of these special interest groups. The form in which this criticism takes is limitless to the degree that it does not physically harm other people. The declaration of international human rights clearly states that every individual has certain inalienable, innately human rights. In terms of communication and the harm principle, article 3 states that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”
The freedom of speech and laws which attempt to govern it comes with huge responsibility. At no point should the freedom to speak one’s mind be used to perpetuate issues of hate and violence. There is certain speech that has allowed for this and has no place in democratic dialogue. However, the freedom to say that which feel is a necessity to a healthy democracy. Silence is just as evil as hate.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Burstyn v Wilson in the 1950s states that disallowing “sacrilegious speech” is ultimately a threat to the individual right to free speech is spot on. Free speech does not stop at the doors of the church. If anything, it becomes increasingly important to question and examine an institutionalized religious system that has caused so much pain and hurt over the centuries. Death in the name of religion has created an atmosphere where what many would describe as “sacrilegious speech” is increasingly important. If we do not question, silence will take over and ignorance will persist.
This is not to say individuals within these groups are denied their right to speak. Just like those who voice dissent, these groups have the law governing their side as well.
There are several reasons for this individual civil liberty approach. First and foremost we are not group thinkers. Humans are inherently individual creatures whom have the ability to think for themselves. Historically speaking as well it has been the power of the individual and the ability to criticize our government, groups, etc that has prove to be most effective and powerful.
When it comes to a recent editorial cartoon depicting the prophet Muhammad, I would be most apt to protect the speaker. While offensive to many people, the cartoon itself was not in horrible taste. Even if it was, the fact that the individual created it bears responsibility on him but also guarantees his freedoms. Many described the cartoon as blasphemous and “sacrilegious.” What they fail to recognize is that although it may indeed be both of these things, there is no stopping an individual from expressing that in which they believe.
The cartoon itself is criticizing Muslim extremists who use their religion as a means to perpetuate fear, hate and violence. If anything it was a criticism against an extreme form of religion that has no place in our world.
Responding to the cartoon with violent protests seemed to perpetuate the message in which the cartoon was conveying. While the Muslim population had full right to engage in their own free speech and protest the escalation of violence was uncalled for. This group—fully protected by free speech laws—has the powerful opportunity to start a dialogue. We all do.
In the often raunchy depictions of Jesus in “Ecce Homo” I would also align myself in protecting the artists free speech rights. As the Supreme Court consistently has stated, even though free speech may be deemed sacrilegious by many, prohibiting the exercise of it would be unconstitutional. Justice Clark made a famous statement in Burstyn v Wilson which stated that the government, citing a separation of church and state, has no obligation to protect religious institutions from real or imagined attacks. In the opinion of the court Clark states “It is not the business of the government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.”
Furthermore, and I do not know how strong of an argument this is, individuals need to evaluate the seriousness of their religion and what it is they fight for in the name of God. If I could say in short—take a chill pill. Not everything is meant to be taken so seriously. If we remain with the status-quo and do not push the boundaries we are stuck in the mundane. Social progress, social understanding requires that we as citizens of this world continually hold people accountable for things. Silence is not golden.
When it comes to religious expression, or denouncement of it for that matter, people are often up in arms following an act of free speech that is in contradiction to their beliefs. Ultimately, we all seek that in which solidifies our previously held beliefs. Look no further than the viewing demographic for both Fox News and MSNBC—two incredibly polarized news organizations.
It is with this ignorance and stubborn attitude that I argue towards the protection of individual civil liberty regardless of the fact if it is used against the group.
The group model does not work. It is failing. While individuals naturally flock to group settings, a collective community in this day and age (religious, political) is primarily established out of hate. An “us vs. them” mentality has been created in the United States wherein for interest groups those which do not within the boundaries of their viewpoints are automatically dismissed.
We all need to be watchdogs of these groups that spew language of hate, messages of intolerance and overall demeanor's of ignorance. By allowing a more individually based law governing communication, higher responsibility is placed on the individual to continually question and ask more of these special interest groups. The form in which this criticism takes is limitless to the degree that it does not physically harm other people. The declaration of international human rights clearly states that every individual has certain inalienable, innately human rights. In terms of communication and the harm principle, article 3 states that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”
The freedom of speech and laws which attempt to govern it comes with huge responsibility. At no point should the freedom to speak one’s mind be used to perpetuate issues of hate and violence. There is certain speech that has allowed for this and has no place in democratic dialogue. However, the freedom to say that which feel is a necessity to a healthy democracy. Silence is just as evil as hate.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Burstyn v Wilson in the 1950s states that disallowing “sacrilegious speech” is ultimately a threat to the individual right to free speech is spot on. Free speech does not stop at the doors of the church. If anything, it becomes increasingly important to question and examine an institutionalized religious system that has caused so much pain and hurt over the centuries. Death in the name of religion has created an atmosphere where what many would describe as “sacrilegious speech” is increasingly important. If we do not question, silence will take over and ignorance will persist.
This is not to say individuals within these groups are denied their right to speak. Just like those who voice dissent, these groups have the law governing their side as well.
There are several reasons for this individual civil liberty approach. First and foremost we are not group thinkers. Humans are inherently individual creatures whom have the ability to think for themselves. Historically speaking as well it has been the power of the individual and the ability to criticize our government, groups, etc that has prove to be most effective and powerful.
When it comes to a recent editorial cartoon depicting the prophet Muhammad, I would be most apt to protect the speaker. While offensive to many people, the cartoon itself was not in horrible taste. Even if it was, the fact that the individual created it bears responsibility on him but also guarantees his freedoms. Many described the cartoon as blasphemous and “sacrilegious.” What they fail to recognize is that although it may indeed be both of these things, there is no stopping an individual from expressing that in which they believe.
The cartoon itself is criticizing Muslim extremists who use their religion as a means to perpetuate fear, hate and violence. If anything it was a criticism against an extreme form of religion that has no place in our world.
Responding to the cartoon with violent protests seemed to perpetuate the message in which the cartoon was conveying. While the Muslim population had full right to engage in their own free speech and protest the escalation of violence was uncalled for. This group—fully protected by free speech laws—has the powerful opportunity to start a dialogue. We all do.
In the often raunchy depictions of Jesus in “Ecce Homo” I would also align myself in protecting the artists free speech rights. As the Supreme Court consistently has stated, even though free speech may be deemed sacrilegious by many, prohibiting the exercise of it would be unconstitutional. Justice Clark made a famous statement in Burstyn v Wilson which stated that the government, citing a separation of church and state, has no obligation to protect religious institutions from real or imagined attacks. In the opinion of the court Clark states “It is not the business of the government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.”
Furthermore, and I do not know how strong of an argument this is, individuals need to evaluate the seriousness of their religion and what it is they fight for in the name of God. If I could say in short—take a chill pill. Not everything is meant to be taken so seriously. If we remain with the status-quo and do not push the boundaries we are stuck in the mundane. Social progress, social understanding requires that we as citizens of this world continually hold people accountable for things. Silence is not golden.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
